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Public participation on dam building in South




This paper examines the participatory processes which led to the building of the Berg
River Dam in South Africa’s Western Cape province. The government-led formal
participatory processes stand in contrast to the mobilisation of environmental activists
against the building of the dam. In this case, the creation of formal participatory forums
both subverted and neutralised resistance of the environmental movement and civil
society against the building of the dam, largely through the mobilisation of policy discourses
on water ‘scarcity’.
Introduction
This paper examines participation in South African water and development
debates in the context of global discourses on water and natural resource
management.1 The recent developmental emphasis on local participation
in natural resource management, particularly water, through global
processes such as the World Commission on Dams (WCD) dialogue and
report (2000) is analysed in relation to how water supply and demand
strategies are framed at the national and local level in South Africa.
This paper seeks to examine these issues by focusing on participatory
processes around water scarcity management in the Western Cape,
contrasting in particular the formal participatory process led by government
in relation to the local environmental movement’s mobilisation efforts
during the leading up to the building of the Berg Water Project (BWP), which
includes the Berg River Dam2 (hereafter referred to as the BWP). The
degree to which communities, especially poorer, more marginalised
groups, are able to exercise their citizenship in meaningful ways is thus
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examined in relation to what Kabeer (2005:23) describes as horizontal
and vertical axes of participation. Horizontal (community based) spaces
refer to those spaces created by citizens themselves (this includes forms
of spontaneous social mobilisation as well as social movement activism).
Vertical spaces include formal and/or institutionalised spaces for
participation organised by government. The degree to which participation
brings about change, or at least a discernible impact on policy, is taken as
the measure of the degree to which participation is meaningful (see, for
example, Cornwall and Coelho 2006). In this case study, policy discourses
on water scarcity form a specific backdrop to forms of participation, as
the policy discourse on water features a strong emphasis on the science
of water scarcity management. In relation to this, debates on water as a
scarce resource have featured prominently in global and national policy
discourses. There is significant societal resistance to the types of ‘scarcity
control’ policies advocated by many governments, as well as controversy
about the construction of scarcity as a validation for many of these
policies (Mehta 2005). The global environmental movement has been at
the forefront of highlighting weaknesses and flaws in local and global
constructions of water scarcity, thereby bringing the notion of water
scarcity into the realm of public scrutiny, particularly in relation to building
dams. The paper thus includes a brief discussion of the role of the
environmental movement in the Berg Dam participatory process.
 This paper aims to highlight the socioeconomic aspects of participation
in discussions of governance of the environment and the management of
scarce natural resources. While the paper focuses on the participatory
dynamics involved in WRM, analytical and policy debates on water as a
‘scarce’ resource are also examined to contextualise the debates on water
supply strategies.
Water resource management in the Western Cape
South Africa’s current National Water Resource Management Policy
Framework has been praised by many international organisations for its
commitment to social justice. Since 1994, two new regulatory Acts came into
force, the Water Services Act (WSA) of 1997 and the National Water Act
(NWA) of 1998. The WSA laid the basis for the government’s Free Basic
Water (FBW) service programme which began in early 2001. This policy
commitment is mediated by the highly politicised debate between the
environmental movement and government on citizenship rights and the
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dominance of neoliberal economic ideology in water service delivery.
This purported bias is said to favour the interests of big business and
industry, wealthy farmers and urban elites rather than the poor with regard
to water allocation, according to analysts such as Bond (2002a, 2002b),
Mehta and Ntshona (2004), Mehta (2005, 2006).
Interviews for this case study in the City of Cape Town (CCT) and with
officials in the Department of Water Affairs (DWAF), which focused on
water supply and demand strategies, show that both bulk water supply and
water service delivery (under the control of DWAF and the CCT) are viewed
as technical management exercises. This obscures many of the trade-offs
being made with regard to managing water as a socio-economic right on the
one hand and as an economic good on the other, as Mehta and Ntshona
(2004) and Mehta (2006) point out. As will become clear from the participatory
process around the building of the BWP, there is also a tendency to
construct notions of water scarcity in purely scientific terms, largely devoid
of political or economic dimensions. In terms of participation, one of the
offshoots of this approach to Water Resource Management (WRM) is that
participants in formal processes must  become proficient in the language of
the scientific policy discourse on water scarcity and how to overcome it, in
order to be taken seriously in public fora on water provision options. The
scientific discourse in dam building has been subject to analytical scrutiny
from both national and international perspectives, and it is to these critiques
that we briefly turn before examining how local communities found themselves
absorbed into the policy debates on water scarcity in the western Cape.
Meanings and interpretations of water scarcity
Du Plessis (2000), Turton (2000) and Ashton (2000) have discussed the
nature of the policy debate on water scarcity in international, regional and
national contexts respectively using constructivist (du Plessis) and neorealist
(Turton and Ashton) analytical perspectives. They concur that the
construction of ‘scarcity’ in policy discussions on water is not something
to be accepted as a purely objective scientific enterprise.3 Turton
(2000:41-55) argues that concepts developed by Homer-Dixon (1996)
such as ‘hydrocide’4 and what Ohlsson  and Turton (1999) have referred to
as ‘water poverty’ and ‘structurally induced relative water abundance
(SIRWA)’ all allude to the link between first order resources (in this case
water), and second order resources, that is the socio-political adaptive
capacity of the state or states concerned in their responses to water
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management. The ways in which states manage competing demands to
water, as well as how they resolve supply and demand issues are an integral
part of what Ohlsson refers to as ‘second order resources’. Turton (2000:
44) explains that it is the ‘social adaptive capacity’ of states (and communities)
which enable them to overcome first order scarcity issues and to evolve to
a point of ‘relative (water) abundance’. States such as Israel show such
adaptive capacity at the policy level with regard to water.
Approaching the debate on regional (transnational) and sub-national
water scarcity from a critical theory perspective, Swatuk and Vale (2000) and
Bond (2002a) point out that the debates on water scarcity coincide with
the unequal allocation and distribution of resources. Scarcity in this
context is understood primarily as in political, rather than in economic or
scientific, terms and relates to what economic policies the state in
question sees fit to adopt. ‘Scarcity for whom?’ the authors pose, noting
that all citizens do not share equally in scarcity or abundance of natural
resources. Relating this point to our case study of water resource
management at the local level in South Africa, the South African government
continues to emphasise the need for more water storage in South Africa
as a way of overcoming scarcity, as is emphasised by the case study
presented here. Bond (2002a) and Swatuk (2000) point out that water
storage and transfer schemes have dominated the South (and southern)
African landscape, with a clear bias towards industrialisation, for decades.
The link between supply and demand side issues will be explored in greater
depth particularly in relation to questions of public input and participation
in subsequent sections of the paper.
The case study of the BWP is also illustrative of the pros and cons of
public participation in natural resource management policy processes as
well as the ways in which lay knowledge and scientific knowledge intersect
and mediate one another. In the context of water management, the construction
of the ‘fact’ of water scarcity illustrates how public knowledge and input are
mediated by the release of information on the part of government. Participation
in the processes which legitimised the building of the dam show the degree
to which some level of ‘expertification’ is necessary to enter such debates
and to be able to participate in meaningful ways. The case study emphasises
the democratisation of participation, and the creation of formal participatory
spaces can lead to the watering down of the force of organised resistance
to the point that it becomes ineffective.
The lead up to the building of the Berg Dam involved a drawn out
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government-driven participatory process aimed at including all ‘interested
and affected parties’, to debate the various options for solving the Western
Cape’s water ‘crisis’. As part of this, in the early 1990s scientific
assessments undertaken by engineering consultants on behalf of
government resulted in a document called the Western Cape Systems
Analysis (WCSA). This document formed the basis of a series of public
meetings which led to the public approval of the dam. Parallel to this
process, a mandatory Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) on the
BWP was undertaken and released for public comment. Finally, civic input
to the process of building the dam was institutionalised through the setting
up of the Environmental Management (now Monitoring) Committee
(EMC). While the dam’s construction did not raise the sort of displacement
of livelihoods issues which have assured the publicity and level of
environmental movement activity associated with mega-dams such as the
Lesotho Highlands Water scheme, and the Sardar Sarovar in India, the
ways in which government drew all stakeholders, including environmental
groups, into public processes related to the actual building of the dam is
indicative of the ways in which vertical spaces of participation may ‘water
down’ more spontaneous (social movement) forms of activism. In the
case of the BWP, activism against the building of the BWP took place
after the public participatory process, and largely on the mobilisation
impetus derived from the World Commission on Dams final report. The
Western Cape government was able to point to public participatory
processes in response to this mobilisation, effectively claiming that the
building of the dam had achieved broad public consensus. As will be pointed
out, this process of public participation was deeply flawed, but still served
to remove the impetus from the environmental movement’s subsequent
mobilisation strategies.
Social movements (SMs) and theoretical perspectives on science,
citizenship, environment and water
Critical development approaches taken by Escobar (1995), Crush (1995) and
others emphasise the degree to which social movements (SMs) challenge
prevailing local and global hegemonic discourses on the ‘science of
development’. How SMs also influence international norms and values,
especially as these relate to the notion of global social justice, is also viewed
as critically important. Stienstra’s (1999) more critical perspective on SMs
emphasises how they also mediate between state and society and can
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perform a regulatory, state legitimising function. Robert Cox’s (1987)
influential work Production, Power and World Order explores the
interplay between social forces and social movements in maintaining or
challenging the international status quo, as well as the spaces in which
distinctive alliances of social forces can lead to changes to global
knowledge and structures.
Questions of representation arise here and are linked to the controversy
about the extent to which NGOs – local, national and international –
represent social movements as well as how collective identities and social
movements coalesce. Stavenhagen (1997:33) makes a distinction between
what he calls ‘truly non-governmental popular organisations’ and NGOs
which are ‘but surrogates of government aid agencies’. The former are
characterised by, amongst other things, ‘the articulation of the demands of
the underdog’, and are often ‘at odds with their own governments and
challenge existing paradigms of governance’, as well as ‘frequently seek to
attain objectives which would entail alternative forms of economic
development, political control and social organisation’. However, the risk of
cooption is ever present (O’Brien et al 2000:20).
The strength of global social movements (GSMs) is said to be their ‘global
vision’ and their major role, ‘the way in which they might contribute to
increasing democracy by creating a global civil society’ (O’Brien et al 2000:
22). However, GSMs are also subject to cooption into formal structures
which can change as well as neutralise resistance.
The prolific work of Patrick Bond focuses on GSMs’ and SMs’ ability to
challenge hegemonic knowledge at both local and global levels, for example,
in South Africa the way that the environmental movement draws on global
anti-commodification and anti-capitalist discourses to challenge the IMF/
World Bank approach to development in general, and water resource
management in particular, as these emphasise the commodification of water
and view natural resource management as a ‘technicist’ science. The degree
to which the South African environmental movement is seen as representative
of grassroots environmental concerns, including brown environmental
issues, has been a contentious issue as environmentalism, especially the
green variety,5 has been branded by some policy-makers in government as
a bourgeois form of activism. This is not in fact the case in South Africa,
as this case study highlights. Dam building resistance has tended to remain
the preserve of the organised environmental movement as a ‘green’
environmental issue, but there has been collaboration with trade unions, and
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joint declarations on related ‘brown’ environmental issues relating to dam
building such as higher water tariffs – which the BWP case highlights well.
However, the environmental movement’s resistance to the BWP only
gained momentum after the formal government-led participation process
had taken place, effectively delegitimising their concerns.
The extent to which horizontal and vertical forms of participation
interface in meaningful ways is an area of enquiry which requires careful
scrutiny, both in terms of broader social movements, as well as community
action in relation to public participatory processes. In relation to the
building of the BWP, two community groupings took part in formal
participatory fora after the dam had been approved. The Franschhoek
Community Alliance and the West Coast User Group (WCUG), challenged
government not in terms of the need for the dam, but on socio-economic,
rights based claims in the case of the Franschhoek Community, and on
environmental impact concerns in relation to the WCUG. The Franschhoek
community,6 as the most affected community because of the proximity of
the dam to the town of Franschhoek, campaigned for a different
interpretation of environmental and socio-economic justice for poorer
communities in the Franschhoek area. The troubled history of the
Franschhoek First strategy has comprised the single biggest challenge to
the existence of the EMC, as discussed in second half of this paper.
 The successes and failures of mobilisation and participation show both
the promises and shortcomings of the concept of environmental justice in
relation to scientific ‘developmental’ claims to water management, particularly
in relation to neo-liberal economic policies. Brian Wynne’s (1996) exploration
of how lay people challenge scientific expertise refers mostly to a ‘developed’
state context. Wynne discusses the ability of less educated, or less ‘policy-
conversant’ groups to challenge these discourses on their own terms and
in relation to their own locally based knowledge of resource management.
The degree to which scientific development is critiqued through processes
of community participation in the southern African, and in this case South
African, context seems to be significantly less than what has been described
by Wynne and others in more developed state contexts, especially when
focusing on poorer urbanised groups. Nonetheless, community resistance
did emerge in relation the building of the Berg River Dam. However, this case
study illustrates the power of the scientific developmental policy frame on
water scarcity in both vertical and horizontal participatory processes.
 Before turning to the BWP case study, a brief discussion of linkages
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between global and local environmental concerns with regard to water
takes place in the next section.
The South African national environmental movement and South
Africa’s neoliberal economic policies in environmental perspective
Environmental mobilisation on the issue of water has occurred in relation to
rights, and in the case of South Africa, this is constitutionally enshrined and
backed up by legislation on FBW. Bond (2002a) and others have focused on
how these rights are mediated through water resource management being
captured in government policy as an economic process. This economic
focus is then fitted into broader governance and developmental frames
(such as New Partnership for Africa’s Development, NEPAD) where the
emphasis is on allowing the forces of the (free) market to ensure economic
growth, and cost-effective delivery of services, including water. At the
governmental level, South Africa has attempted to reconcile these two
departure points, arguing that they are not mutually incompatible. In fact,
as an offshoot of the Bonn Recommendations for Action (2001) following the
International Conference on Freshwater held in 2001, the Declaration of the
African Ministers (2001) makes this commitment explicit (and shows South
Africa’s African influence at international fora at the same time). The
declaration reads: ‘We are determined that our governments, non-
governmental organisations, civil society and the private sector extend full
support to the implementation goals of the NEPAD’ (Declaration of the
African Ministers 2001).
The environmental movement has been instrumental in highlighting the
tensions between environmental justice approaches to water service delivery
and the neoliberal developmental emphasis on cost recovery. Important in
this regard are the roles of formal and informal groups linked to SANGOCO
(South African NGO Coalition), as well as those linked to or taking their cue
from the Social Movements Indaba, organised around the time of the WSSD
in Johannesburg (Bond 2002a). In the Cape region, the most influential of
these groupings have been the Environmental Monitoring Group (EMG) and
the Wildlife and Environmental Society of Southern Africa (WESSA) as well
as, to a lesser extent, the local branch of Earthlife and the South African
Municipal Workers Union (SAMWU).
In South Africa, government water resource management strategies
which have attempted to reconcile rights based and economic goods based
approaches to water have had different impacts, depending on the translation
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of specific policies into practice. The FBW policy is a good example of
this. According to Liane Greeff of the EMG, the FBW policy is being
interpreted differently and applied differently in various parts of the
country. In general, cost recovery and cut-off structures are in conflict
with FBW. According to Greeff, it seems that ‘the technocrats are not
working sufficiently with communities to find solutions’ (Greeff, EMG,
Interview July 16, 2004) (see also Bond 2002a).
The importance of water as both an economic good as well as a
fundamental right has been made much more visible in the South African
context through the government’s direct involvement in the WCD process.
Kader Asmal, a commissioner to the WCD and one of the influential
government forces behind the Cape Town based WCD secretariat, played
an instrumental role in creating a hitherto unprecedented platform for
interaction on water resource management between environmental NGOs,
CSOs, civil society groupings, international environmental groups (such as
the International Rivers Network) and government. A multi-stakeholder
symposium to allow for interaction, debate and deliberation on the WCD
process was also held in South Africa in July 2001. Parallel to this process,
as well as arising from it, was the creation of national, regional and international
networking structures.7
Resistance to dam building at both local and national level has been
increasingly sustained by these networks, as well as by the WCD process.
In terms of mobilising broader grassroots resistance, the environmental
movement’s strategic alliance with disadvantaged groups has tended to
coalesce more on issues of service delivery and the economic impact of water
resource management, the brown environmental issues referred to earlier,
than on what are perceived as essentially green environmental issues (Bond
2002a, 2002b, MacDonald 2002).
The WCSA process initiated by government and the BWP Environmental
Impact Assessment , which culminated in the setting up of the EMC, initially
removed the impetus from the environmental movement’s resistance with
regard to protesting about the dam and its potential socio-economic impact.
The very clear support of the disadvantaged communities of Franschhoek,
Paarl and Wellington for the building of the dam in terms of job creation made
mobilisation against it somewhat difficult in terms of social justice concerns,
especially in terms of WCD criteria (which state explicitly that affected
parties compliance is critical). In addition, Greeff of the EMG (Interview July
16, 2004) points out that most of the local NGOs and CBOs which involved
10
Lisa Thompson
in channelling and organising resistance to dam building were asked to
participate in the WCSA process. Greeff states further that ‘a lot of energy
went into opposing the Lesotho Highlands water project… (t)here are just
so many issues and people just don’t have a lot of time to get on top of all
the different dams’ (Greeff, EMG, Interview July 16, 2004). The extent to
which environmental NGOs as representatives of SMs become involved in
policy debates is also largely contingent on funding and staff – and of course
sufficient grassroots resistance. O’Brien  (2000:12) points out that social
movements ‘rely on mass mobilisation because they do not directly
control levers of power such as the state’. Where such mass mobilisation
is not present, in either its local, national or global form, the impetus
which environmental  NGOs can bring to bear appears minimalised. In the
case of the BWP, the dam was motivated by government as necessary to
alleviate the imminent crisis of water scarcity facing the Western Cape.
This helped to validate the formal (vertical) processes of participation and
to undermine other (horizontal) forms of resistance.
The participation process on water scarcity in the Western Cape
In spite of the lack of an official Water Demand Strategy in 1989, the then
provincial government proposed the building of another large dam in the
Western Cape, arguing that another dam was necessary to ensure sufficient
storage for summer months. The Western Cape already has a number of large
dams, which supply the CCT and outlying towns. The largest and most
important of these is the Theewaterskloof dam in the Villiersdorp area, which
is part of a larger inter-basin transfer scheme which includes the Berg
River, Voëlvlei in the Breede River area, Wemmershoek dam in
Franschhoek, and the Steenbras upper and lower dam in the Helderberg/
Gordons Bay area. All of these dams are considered large dams by
international standards, and there are a number of smaller dams and
diversion schemes as well. ‘Supply assurance’ for industrial growth and
domestic consumption has been the chief rationale on the part of
government for building another dam in the Western Cape. This rationale
continued throughout the Democratic Alliance (DA) era of the late 1990s
in the Western Cape (where the DA and the National Party – NP –
dominated in provincial legislature, effectively controlling the province)
and is still prevalent among the current provincial and local government
structures dealing with water (Dowling, WESSA, Interview June 8, 2004).
The initial building of the BWP was proposed in the late 1980s, when
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dam building was not yet contested in South Africa. As one local government
interviewee put it, ‘in those days it used to be a simple process, we decided
we wanted a dam and then we went ahead and built it’. However the dam’s
official approval process ran into the democratisation of local governance
processes which began in the mid 1990s. Early pressure from local
environmental groups on the proposed building of the dam led to the
Western Cape Systems Analysis (WCSA) Evaluation Process that took
place between 1995-1996 (Ninham Shand 1996:4).
The WCSA/EIA process mentioned earlier should be seen in the context
of how formal participatory spaces were managed by both provincial and
local government structures. DWAF at provincial level, and the City of Cape
Town at the local government level, proposed a set of options to a group of
selected ‘interested and affected parties’ in a series of publicly advertised
meetings. These options were packaged and presented by the consulting
engineering firm favoured by DWAF in the Western Cape (Ninham Shand),
and the participation process was contracted out to a conflict management
and participation consultancy (Zille Shandler and Associates). Participants
were posed with an array of options. The most feasible, according to various
scientific academic reports attached to official documentation, was the Berg
River dam – if the Western Cape’s water scarcity problem was to be
addressed in the medium term. The entire WCSA participatory process then
ran parallel to the development of the BWP EIA, which is mandatory in terms
of environmental legislation.8 The government rationale for the parallel
processes was that the water crisis in the Cape region was so acute that the
EIA process could not be put on hold, as it might jeopardise the water
security of the region if the building of the dam was delayed in any way
(Fourie, Interview December 12, 2003; Dowling, Interview June 8, 2004). As
a result, many participants who were involved in the WCSA were under the
impression that they were involved in a ‘post-hoc’ process – as EIAs are not
usually commissioned before public consensus is reached. A few excerpts
from the minutes of meetings, as well as some of the (many) comments
from participants, emphasise how ineffective government/consultancy
tactics were in addressing public concerns:
… (a participant) raised a concern that the Skuifraam Scheme was
perceived to be a fait accompli and that the decision to build the dam had
already been taken.  (WCSA Public Meeting, Paarl, December 4, 1995)
It was suggested that the WCSA evaluation was a whitewash. (WCSA
Public Meeting, Grabouw, February 13, 1996)
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It was argued that engineers were promoting the building of dams
because they had a vested interest in building them. (WCSA Public
Meeting, Villiersdorp, March 26, 1996)
Concern was expressed that the Skuifraam Dam IEM process and the
Western Cape Systems Analysis evaluation are running at the same time
and that participants do not have the capacity to make a meaningful
input into both processes. (Skuifraam Dam Integrated Environmental
Management Process, Workshop, Franschhoek, June 13, 1996)
As a result of these concerns, a Task Team was elected by participants to
the WCSA process to deliberate the supply and demand side options set out
in the WCSA documentation. A series of independent reports were
commissioned from scientists, and economists and a social impact study
was also done (WCSA Evaluation Report, Ninham Shand and DWAF 1997).
Based on the scientific reports, the Task Team then ranked the supply and
demand side options provided by DWAF and gave the go ahead for the
building of the BWP dam, providing the EIA process raised no strong
environmental concerns. Interviewees involved in the process have
conveyed that there really was no other choice to the BWP in terms of the
ranking of options (see endnote 13) (Fourie, Interview December 12,
2003; Dowling, Interview June 8, 2004, WCSA, 1997).
The final EIA document, also commissioned by DWAF from Ninham
Shand, was publicly aired in 1996 and calls for comment were made. By the
end of 1997 this process had been finalised, save one of the final conditions
for the building of the dam made by the then Minister of Water Affairs Kader
Asmal – that the CCT show its commitment to Water Demand Management
through the drafting and implementation of an effective water demand
management strategy.
It was only from early 1999 – over a year after the formal participation
processes were wound up – that there were further objections to the building
of Berg River Dam from local and national environmental groups. As
mentioned, this opposition flared largely as a result of the development of
the formal WCD guidelines on environmentally sustainable dam building.
The environmental NGOs opposed the dam in terms of three factors: the lack
of demand management on the part of the CCT, the increase in cost to Cape
Town’s water supply, and environmental impacts to the whole of the Berg
River system (EMG Letter to Department of Environment and Tourism
(DEAT) and DWAF July 29, 1999). SAMWU was opposed to the building
of the dam more purely in terms of its effects on water tariffs for the poor.
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According to SAMWU,
[i]t is SAMWUs position that there will be a drastic increase in water
tariffs as a direct result of this project that will hit the poor of Cape Town,
who are battling to pay for water. (SAMWU Press Statement, July 29,
1999)
Some of the points made by the EMG’s submission to DEAT and DWAF
were again reiterated in a letter to the new Minister of Water Affairs,
Ronnie Kasrils, in February 2001. At this stage EMG drew on its considerable
involvement in the WCD process to argue that the BWP needed to be more
thoroughly debated before being implemented, and that a multi-stakeholder
workshop should be held to illustrate that if, against the background of the
WCD, ‘the dam is indeed the last resort and is the best option’(Greeff, July
2004; EMG letter to DWAF, February 2, 2001). Economic viability in the light
of other options was also highlighted. Kasrils’ reply dismissed any further
deliberations on the dam, stating
[…](a)s regards the (BWP) dam I would like to reiterate what I have said
at the recent WCD Forum meeting. The processes which have been
followed up until this point had been thorough and closely conformed
to all prescripts of existing rules and regulations. We have examined the
processes followed against the WCD guidelines and found there to be
good compliance ... I trust that you will understand my position on this
issue and that I have to take into regard that delays in the construction
of (BWP) Dam will cause the risk of severe water shortages to the Cape
Metropole to be simply too high. (DWAF 2001, Kasrils, Letter to
EMG, May 8, 2001)
The role of scientific consultancies in mediating the socio-economic aspects
of WRM cannot be underestimated. For example, in response to criticism of
BWP as out of line with the WCD, Ninham Shand’s Environmental Division
together with DWAF, prepared a review paper detailing the WCD guidelines
applicability to the BWP for the WCD Symposium held in Gauteng in July
2001. The document makes for interesting reading, as it outlines the degree
to which WCD guidelines are ‘relevant’ to the building of the dam. The
authors of the paper, Luger and Van Niekerk of Ninham Shand, state
[t]he review concluded that the environmental and public participation
processes undertaken for the (BWP) dam broadly complied with the
WCD guidelines. However it became clear that certain of the guidelines




As the discussion on the EMC below highlights, this dismissal of the WCD
guidelines amounts to a denial on the part of the WCSA and EIA consultants
of the potential effects of the building of the dam on the ecology of the
West Coast, as well as its related socio-economic impact – two issues
which are stressed as very important in WCD guidelines.
The cost of the BWP: implications for social justice?
The socio economic impact of the dam has not received much attention in
the media, in spite of the fact that according to City of Cape Town officials
themselves, the WCSA participation process did not fully consider demand-
side and recycling alternatives. As a chief official in Reticulation Services
in the CCT states,
The (WSDP-figure of the) amount of water recycling of between 6-15
per cent is a thumbsuck. It depends on the season and is sometimes more
than that, but in 6 months we may have a better sense [...] We believe
that a very big part of the potential yield of Skuifraam, that is now
costing one point something billion rand, could be achieved much
cheaper by recycling and replacing treated effluent for irrigation instead
of potable water. (Interview May 20, 2004)
The WDM strategy was developed in the mid 1990s to show DWAF that the
Berg River Dam was really needed, as DWAF will not underwrite new dam
schemes in the absence of visible WDM strategies (Dowling, Interview  June
8, 2004). The Integrated Water Resources Plan (IWRP) identified three
‘supply and demand’ packages which are seen as complementary to the
BWP, and are supposed to help bring down water demand, as well as cater
for water demands which, according to growth projections, will exceed
supply of even the Berg dam by 2010/2.9 Recycling of water is mentioned
briefly in the WSDP (pages 47-8) stating that it is a priority and that ‘the CCT
has appointed consultants to refine the work carried out in the IWRP study’
(City of Cape Town 2001:48).
Ironically, the dam will only be completed in 2007, and in the intervening
years the Cape Province has managed on available water, although the
severe 2004/5 drought brought about severe water restrictions. This does
throw some doubt as to the urgency for the dam as stressed by government.
It also highlights the linkage between the socio-economic dimensions of
water management, and the science of water supply management as discussed
at the beginning of this paper. Interestingly, the 2005 water shortage was
blamed on the environmental movement as having delayed the building of
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the dam, although the movement’s belated resistance had virtually no
impact on its start and completion date (Argus, January 6, 2005).
According to the CCT’s figures, the average increase of water tariffs
for the next five years will be around 10 per cent per year, almost doubling
the cost of water in the next ten years.10 This ‘step up, step down tariffing’
to the building of the dam is said to involve the least risk to the CCT and
the TCTA, and will mean that future supply schemes can be implemented
towards the end of the decade (CCT Bulk Water Supply Division 2004;
Killick, CCT, Interview June 15, 2004). The full impact of the dam on tariffs
will only be felt towards the end of the building, as it is then when the
unforeseen costs will have a knock-on effect of the full amount owing.
There has been little resistance to these price estimates by either affluent
or poorer ratepayers. This seems less as a result of apathy than lack of
knowledge, combined with the CCT’s ongoing insistence as to how water
scarce the Western Cape has become. Information on the cost implications
of the dam to the public has been sorely lacking, and the environmental
movements have not been very successful in obtaining figures from
government. As Laine Greeff (Interview July 16) of the EMG and Patrick
Dowling (Interview June 8, 2004) of WESSA have pointed out, the motivation
of groups like SAMWU to mobilise has usually been linked to the effect
which water resource management has on poorer communities. The CCT and
DWAF have reason to be hesitant to divulge the full financial implications
of the dam on tariffs.
To summarise thus far, in the broader Western Cape context, the building
of the Berg River Dam has elicited the rise of three kinds of community
participation. The first of these is the process of formal (or vertical)
participation which took place through the WCSA and EIA processes. The
second form of participation has taken place through the resistance which
arose around the WCD process mainly from the environmental movement.
The third kind of participation resulted out of specific issues which have
concerned smaller community groupings, such as the Franschhoek
Community and the West Coast User Group (WCUG) mentioned in earlier.
These latter forms of organisation can loosely be described vertical forms
of participation as defined by Kabeer (2005). The initial activism around the
concerns of these two groups has fed into the Environmental Monitoring
Group (EMC) participatory processes, thus providing a case study of how
horizontal and vertical forms of participation articulate. It is to the EMC
participatory process that we now turn.
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The Environmental Monitoring Committee (EMC)
The institutional concept of an EMC comes from the National
Environmental Management Act, NEMA, Act 107 of 1998, which makes
provision for EMCs as public participatory spaces to oversee ecological
or developmentally sensitive environmental policy processes (see DEAT
2005). The logic behind EMCs is that while they are in fact created by
government, they are to be fundamentally non-governmental in their
representation of all ‘Interested and Affected Parties’’ interests in
sustainable development processes. Environmental Monitoring
Committees are to be set up (where deemed appropriate by the Department
of Environment, Agriculture and Tourism, hereafter referred to as DEAT)
through the Record of Decision (ROD) process following an Environmental
Impact Assessment (EIA). The latter is in itself a formally constituted
participatory process which will also be discussed briefly here. EMCs fall
into that strange category of public representation as a result – a government
organised non-governmental organisation (GONGO) – in that most of the
representatives which constitute it are from civil society groupings,
including the Chair. There are of course government representatives as
well, but they are ostensibly there to assist in the role of public monitoring
– at least in theory.
The Berg Dam EMC is the first of its kind to be constituted since NEMA
came into effect, and its creation, evolution and current state of institutional
torpor are useful indicators of the potentialities and limits of this type of
government organised space.11 The circumstances leading up the
establishment of the EMC are not particularly unusual to environmental
debates, especially those around dam building, and thus the problems that
have beset this EMC are likely to arise again in the future.
The EMC was set up in 2003, and consists of stakeholders who will be
affected by the dam, ie upstream and downstream users (but notably not
broad based urban groups). According to the Record of Decision (ROD)
which came into effect once the EIA process had been through governmental
channels, the Environmental Management Committee should be set in place
by government to ensure ongoing participation of interested and affected
parties. Ratepayers, previously disadvantaged groups, farmers, business-
people and those involved in Franschhoek’s tourist trade are represented,
as well as the CCT, local and provincial government, and DWAF.
Interestingly, while Paarl, Wellington, Villiersdorp and Franschhoek are
represented in terms of civil society groupings, the Cape Town
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metropolitan area is represented only through environmental groups, and
there are no urban user associations on the EMC despite the cost and
environmental implications for urban water users. Thus while the dam is
mostly being constructed for urban water usage, the EMC represents only
peri-urban and ‘rural’ civil society. The degree to which this has been a
strategy to legitimate the acceptance of the dam has been debated within
and outside the EMC. Certainly the perception of cooptation seems to be
an issue, and one which has raised its head throughout the EMCs troubled
existence.
Three major issues have bedevilled the EMC since its inception. These
are the issues of water quality and the salination effects of the dam on the
lower Berg River; the issue of indemnity of committee members, and socio-
economic issues around livelihoods and the environment (Venter, EMC
Chair, Interview May 8, 2004).
Debates around water quality are led by Dr Martin Fourie (a retired
engineer) of West Coast User Group (WCUG) who has the scientific
knowledge to be able to challenge DWAF and Ninham Shand’s projections
of the effects of the dam on the Berg River estuary. According to Fourie, the
issue of water quality was not addressed by the original EIA and the impact
of higher salination levels on the Berg estuary will be severe, causing both
ecological damage and also affecting downstream industries as well as
potential industrial development (Fourie, WCUG, Interview December 12,
2003; June 4, 2004). Fourie was also instrumental in mobilising the West
Coast community on the issue of salination, and in ensuring that the WCUG
got representation on the EMC. Initially, the West Coast was ‘accidentally’
left out of the process of public consultation on the EIA process, as well as
the setting up of the EMC.
It is clear that the issue of downstream water quality cannot be ignored.
However it is an especially difficult debate to enter into for the layperson.
Flow weighted averages which are used to determine water quality in rivers
are worked out using scientific calculations and different forms of modelling
which are to the lay person quite impenetrable.12 Fourie has the support of
environmental groups, but has been unable to exact any clear commitment
to the problem he has highlighted within the EMC. Indeed, he is seen as
something of a figure of fun by engineers at Ninham Shand who claim his data
is unscientific. As Gorgens (Chief Engineer at Ninham Shand) put it in a
personal interview,
… (his) approach is not totally scientific, although it has a fair degree of
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science in it. Right from the start I used to appreciate Martin’s role
because he was ‘pushing the boundaries’ and he was basically doing
what all of us should be doing which is go out there and fight for our rights
as we see them, even if we may see them wrongly. I am not saying what
he is saying is not right. But his data is suspect (Gorgens, Ninham Shand,
Interview June 1, 2004).
Government (and Ninham Shand) have argued that the EMC is not the ‘right
place’ (or space) to be bringing up the problem of salinity effects on
downstream users. This should be done through the Catchment Councils
(which have yet to be set up in this catchment area as well as nationally), or
through the EIA process which ran its course in the late 1990s. Paradoxically
then, this particular environmental impact is seen as ‘beyond the mandate
of the committee’. This has raised real concerns as to the real power of the
committee as a civil society ‘watchdog’.
Thus, the EMC set up to monitor the building of the dam and to ensure
civil society input to the process, has not been given powers of intervention
should the dam building process raise serious environmental problems. This
has led to another issue of contention – that of indemnity of those who sit
on the Committee, especially those wealthy Franschhoek entrepreneurs who
have lent their weight to the Franschhoek community representation on the
EMC.
As Venter (EMC Chair, Interview May 22, 2005) points out, the EMC
cannot halt the building of the dam, even though the committee is seen as
responsible for addressing civil society issues. Instead, the EMC has to
report to the Trans Caledon Transport Authority (TCTA), which is the
government company appointed to oversee the building of the dam (and
which incidentally, also oversaw the building of the highly controversial
Lesotho Highlands Water Project). The TCTA in turn reports to DWAF.
Fears of members within the EMC are that problems could then potentially
spill over into potential liability cases. Ironically then, civil society
representatives rather than government may be held responsible by affected
communities. The TCTA and DEAT finally responded to this matter through
the release of a publication on EMCs. The report argues that EMCs cannot
be held liable, as ‘the EMC is not one of the more common forms of legal entity
... (t)he EMC does not have a separate legal entity and so could not be sued
in its own name as a juristic person’ (DEAT 2005: 13).  However, many
EMC members remain unconvinced of this argument (Venter, EMC Chair,
Interview May 22, 2005).
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The question of the mandate and power of the EMC also came to a head
over its name. Members of the committee argued that since the ROD referred
to a ‘management’ committee, by rights more power over the process of
dam-building should be accorded. Government responded by changing the
name of the committee from ‘management’ to ‘monitoring’. While
members have felt cheated by this sleight of hand, the issue of indemnity
has been the channel through which the sense of powerlessness has been
turned around and reflected back on government. The EMC has consistently
drawn into question the degree to which government has given it a mandate
to play a useful monitoring role over the building of the dam, and the EMCs
focus on questions such as indemnity (to the great discomfort of the TCTA
and other government representatives) show a lay understanding of the
ways in which government can use formally created spaces of participation
as a way of trying to control possible civil society resistance or
dissatisfaction with policy decisions. The indemnity issue had not been
resolved as of 2006 (Venter, EMC Chair, Interview August 17, 2006).
The third participation and legitimacy issue within the EMC is in
relation to its monitoring of the empowerment initiatives which the dam
contractors are beholden to under the auspices of the TCTA. At an EMC
meeting held on June 10, 2004, the agenda was turned aside due to the
inputs of the Franschhoek community. Just two weeks earlier the new
TCTA appointed contractor had already sub-contracted to a company in
Paarl to do the stone crushing and bush clearing required before the dam
construction could begin, immediately undermining the affirmative action
commitment in the eyes of the majority of local residents.
Subsequent efforts on the part of the EMC Chair to bring the Franschhoek
community back into the EMC have failed, largely as a result of the fact that
the TCTA representatives refused to apologise for the conduct of the TCTA
as state owned company in charge of overseeing the Franschhoek First
policy (Venter, EMC Chair, Interview May 22, 2005; August 17, 2006).
Largely as a result of the ensuing impasse between the Franschhoek
Community and government, in 2005 both DEAT and DWAF officials
claimed that the EMC had become ‘dysfunctional’ and should be replaced
by public meetings as a more ‘functional’ form of public involvement.
However, remaining EMC committee members – most notably those
representing stakeholder interests downstream of the dam, insisted that
the EMC still had a role to play. Backed by legal counsel, members of the
Committee declared that it would be against the EMC’s ROD to be
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disbanded, and an interdict was brought against DEAT to this effect. After
several stand off meetings between the Chairperson, DEAT and the TCTA,
it was finally agreed that the EMC would continue to function, once
‘conduct guidelines’ were laid down. The EMC’s role has been reduced to
keeping track of what are known as ‘sustainable utilisation processes’
(SUPs) and monitoring environmental activities related to the dam in
terms of the Environmental Management Plan (Venter, EMC Chair,
Interview August 17, 2006).
Venter, as Chair of the Committee and head of the EMC Secretariat, states,
‘…the EMC was fine as long as it was a yaysayer…but as soon as it started
to criticise (government) it was a problem. Why is government so worried
about criticism?’ (Venter, EMC Chair, Interview August 17, 2006). Members
have called the committee a ‘toothless tiger’, but those who are ostensibly
still committed to its monitoring role have remained within its ranks. Ironically,
it has fallen to the remaining members to monitor the social responsibility
dimension of the dam’s construction (the Franschhoek First policy) as well,
as the Franschhoek Community no longer participates.
Conclusion
As the WCD, WCSA and EMC participatory process make clear, at
international/national; national/provincial and provincial/local levels
respectively, the local and the global are interconnected by the scientific
discourse on scarcity in relation to water resource management and
development. This discourse tends to privilege understandings of water as
an economic good, to be managed through scientific development strategies.
The political economy of water – which takes into account the social,
environmental and political (as well as economic) aspects of water seems
ambivalently translated into current WRM policy strategies in the western
Cape.
There is also a tension – and a complex set of power relations – underlying
the science of managing scarce resources which is juxtaposed in many ways
to the language of rights and empowerment of actors, in particular
disadvantaged groups.
The case study also shows how the technological nature of the water
management discourse also alienates those who are less educated and less
well informed in the South. As is clear from the WCSA and the EIA
processes as well as larger national and international processes such as
those around the WCD, the really poor and uneducated are unlikely to be
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able to challenge the science which underpins these processes, even if
they do participate. This does not necessarily translate into general
passivity however – the Franschhoek Community’s and WCUG’s stance
on the BWP dam building process shows that participatory fora can still
be used in ways which allow for community mobilisation – although the
outcomes of challenges in such public spaces may be less than satisfactory
to the less powerful participants.
Anti-globalisation, anti-commoditisation movements on the
environment, natural resource management, and on dam building, have
been much more vociferous at the national level in the South African
context (Bond 2002b, Greeff, Interview July 16, 2004). While these
debates are certainly at least indirectly relevant to supply side biases in
broader water resource development strategies such as that of the Western
Cape provincial government, this case study indicates there may be
insufficient synergy between local and national activists’ networks leading
to the kind of social movement activism found on dam building in India for
example (Mehta 2005).
The BWP case highlights the different layers of policy discourse on
green and brown environmental issues, and the ways in which these are
dealt with in developmental terms at the local level, as well as the
challenges and potential pitfalls of participation for civil society, either
through formal  (vertical) participatory spaces or through social
mobilisation (horizontal participation) in relation to water resource
management and development discourses.
Notes
1. These themes build on research on the theme of Citizenship and Science in the
Global Context in the Development Research Centre on Citizenship, Participation
and Accountability, funded by DFID and hosted by the Institute of Development
Studies at the University of Sussex. A different version of this paper was
published as Thompson, L (2005) ‘Managing mobilisation: participatory processes
and dam building in South Africa, the case of the  Berg River Project’, Working
Paper 254 by the IDS.
2. The dam was originally called ‘Skuifraam’ after the name of the largest farm on
which the dam would be built. The Project consists of the dam as well as a
supplement scheme.
3. While Turton (2000) does emphasise the political aspect of managing water
scarcity, his analysis places emphasis on the state. Swatuk and Vale (2000) and
Thompson (2002) argue that this obscures the role of local communities in
determining water resource allocation priorities.
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4. Hydrocide refers specifically to a state’s inability (or unwillingness) to use its
water resources in an environmentally sustainable way – waste water returned
to rivers untreated is one example with regional implications.
5. McDonald (2000:13) makes the distinction between brown and green
environmental concerns, the former referring to issues of water, sanitation and
sewerage as well as basic infrastructure such as roads and drains that are so
lacking in many urban townships.
6. Franschhoek is situated a short distance from the Cape Town Metropolitan Area
(CMA).
7. The South African Water Caucus (SAWC) is one example. In 2001 the EMG co-
hosted the WCD multi-stakeholder symposium together with DWAF, the
National Committee on Large Dams and the World Conservation Union (IUCN)
8. EIA processes were tightened up even further by revisions made in 1997 to the
Environmental Conservation Act of 1989.
9. In detail, Package 1 targets low income areas (it includes pressure management
initiatives, user education, eliminating automatic flush urinals, repairing leaks
and tariffs, metering and credit control). Package 2 targets businesses and large
consumers, and includes promoting boreholes; introducing water efficient
fittings and promoting grey water reuse. Package 3 once again looks at supply
side strategies – highlighting for example the Voëlvlei Augmentation scheme; the
use of the Table Mountain aquifer near Franschhoek; diverting water from the
Lourens River in Somerset West; using treated wastewater for irrigation, and
right down on the list, ‘treated wastewater reclaimed to potable standard’. The
last on the list is desalinating sea water, preceded by the idea of towing icebergs
to the Cape (City of Cape Town 2001: 43).
10. Assuming a low inflation rate of 6.5 per cent the average water tariff is set to
rise by 10 per cent between 2003/4 and 2006/7 – or 50 per cent in five years,
and thereafter at between 5 and 9 per cent (Killick, Interview June 15, 2004).
11. While other examples of EMCs are discussed in the document released by DEAT
(2005) the BWP EMC oversees the only environmental project run entirely by
government.
12. In simple terms, the debate arises as to how often the average of salinity levels
is checked as this can vary greatly depending on offtake and seasonal rains.
Fourie’s argument is that the original EIA has used projected averages that do
not take sufficient account of this variability in the Berg. As a result, Fourie is
of the view that the grave salinity problems that the West Coast will face are
not to be found in Ninham Shand’s EIA report. If Fourie’s reading of the situation
is correct, given the fragile eco-system and development status of the West
Coast, the long term potential environmental consequences could be very serious
indeed.
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